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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Susan Tappeiner, Petitioner,
v. 
State of South Carolina, Respondent, 
Appellate Case No. 2013-001885 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Appeal from Beaufort County 

The Honorable Perry M. Buckner, III, Circuit Court 

Judge
 
Opinion No. 27632 

Submitted March 15, 2016 – Filed May 4, 2016 

REVERSED 
Tara Dawn Shurling, of Law Office of Tara Dawn 
Shurling, PA, of Columbia, for Petitioner. 
Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, and Assistant 
Attorney General J. Rutledge Johnson, both of Columbia, 
for Respondent. 
JUSTICE HEARN: A Beaufort County jury convicted Susan 
Tappeiner of criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor, second degree. 
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Tappeiner withdrew her direct appeal and filed an application for post-conviction 
relief (PCR), asserting, inter alia, that her trial counsel was deficient in failing to 
object to the State's improper remarks during closing arguments.  The PCR court 
denied her relief, finding that although trial counsel was deficient in failing to 
object, Tappeiner was not prejudiced by the deficient performance.  We reverse. 
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In February 2009, Victim informed his school resource officer that he was 
sexually assaulted by Tappeiner, his forty-two year old neighbor.  Victim stated the 
assault happened in August 2008, approximately seven weeks before his fourteenth 
birthday. 
According to Victim, on that August night, he went to Tappeiner's house 
with his sister and a neighbor to watch movies with Tappeiner, her husband, and 
their two daughters while his parents were out of town.  Tappeiner and her husband 
were drinking alcohol during the movies, although neither was noticeably 
intoxicated. By the end of the last movie, all of the children except Victim had 
fallen asleep in front of the television, and Tappeiner's husband had gone upstairs 
to bed. Tappeiner briefly left the room where the children lay sleeping, then 
reentered and began fondling Victim's penis.  When he resisted, Tappeiner pulled 
Victim upstairs into her daughter's bedroom, where she forced him to perform oral 
sex on her, as well as engage in vaginal intercourse.  Although Victim stated he 
screamed for help, apparently no one heard him or woke up.  Eventually, Victim
was able to escape and return home.1 
Tappeiner was arrested and indicted for CSC with a minor, second degree. 
From the outset of the trial, both parties acknowledged there was no physical 
1 During the police investigation into Victim's allegations, Tappeiner voluntarily 
went to the police station and made a statement in which she confessed she had 
sexual intercourse with Victim.  However, after the Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368 (1964), hearing the trial court granted Tappeiner's motion to suppress, finding 
the statement involuntarily-made based primarily on expert testimony that 
Tappeiner was heavily abusing alcohol and Klonopin, an antianxiety drug, at the 
time she made the statement. According to the testimony, Klonopin is a powerful 
tranquilizer that may cause side effects such as dizziness, nausea, blurred vision,
poor judgment, lack of balance and coordination, sleep disturbances, amnesia, 
forgetfulness, fainting, or seizures. 
14 

  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                        
 
 
evidence of the alleged crime, and therefore the case was entirely dependent on a 
credibility determination between Victim and Tappeiner.  The State presented 
testimony from Victim, the school resource officer, two police officers, and a 
counselor at a local rape crisis center, who was qualified as an expert witness in
forensic interviewing.  Notably, although the rape crisis counselor interviewed 
Victim after he reported the assault, she did not testify as to that interview, instead 
merely addressing the solicitor's hypothetical questions as to why child victims of 
sex crimes may delay reporting the abuse.  In an effort to corroborate Victim's 
story as to the details of the assault, the State introduced the dress and panties that 
Tappeiner allegedly wore during the attack because both articles of clothing were 
very distinctive.  However, both items were clean and did not contain any DNA 
evidence. 
In Tappeiner's defense, trial counsel called one witness—Tappeiner's
husband. He testified that on the night in question, he accompanied his wife to bed 
at the end of the last movie, he slept with her all night, and she did not leave the 
bed for any reason. He stated his wife was "a little loopy" from the combination of
her antianxiety medication and alcohol, and likely was not able to remember 
anything that occurred that night.  However, he recalled that his wife was not 
wearing the clothing Victim described.  Further, Tappeiner's husband asserted he
was a light sleeper, and their house is small, such that he definitely would have 
heard Victim if he had yelled out, as alleged, that night.  Moreover, Tappeiner's 
husband testified one of their dogs was "very protective and would have barked" at 
any loud noises, such as if Victim had shouted.  Tappeiner's husband further stated 
that when he awoke the following morning, Victim was still sleeping in the living 
room with the other children, and when Victim awoke, he acted completely 
"normal," entering the kitchen to have breakfast with him.  Finally, Tappeiner's
husband testified that prior to Victim reporting the assault, several neighbors 
informed the couple that Victim and his sisters were using the Tappeiners' 
hideaway key to enter their home without their permission, which could explain 
how Victim was able to describe the articles of clothing in question.2 
2 According to Tappeiner's husband, at some point after the night of the alleged
assault, Tappeiner hired Victim's sisters to babysit for her daughters after school 
and provided them with the location of her hideaway key.  However, Tappeiner 
later fired the sisters after learning of the sisters' and Victim's entry into her house 
at times when the sisters were not babysitting.
15 

  
 
 
 
 
                                        
 
During closing arguments, trial counsel asserted "[t]here's no scientific 
evidence here. There's no semen.  There's no DNA."  Citing repeatedly to 
Tappeiner's husband's testimony, trial counsel discussed the discrepancies between 
the version of events offered by Victim and the husband, such as Tappeiner not
wearing the described clothing on the night in question, and that she slept with her 
husband all night after the last movie ended.  Moreover, trial counsel pointed out
that Victim's story was unlikely, as the house was small and someone would have 
heard him screaming; he remained in the house after the alleged assault and had 
breakfast with Tappeiner's husband the next morning like normal; and, given the 
disparity in sizes between Victim and Tappeiner, Tappeiner would have been 
unable to physically drag him upstairs if he was resisting.  Trial counsel then 
criticized the rape crisis counselor's testimony, stating "she gave no information 
that was really specifically related to [V]ictim."  Finally, trial counsel also 
reminded the jury that Victim had unauthorized access to the Tappeiner house via 
the hideaway key. 
By contrast, the solicitor reiterated that this case centered on credibility. 
After stating to the jurors that "Victim looked [them] in the eye" to aid them in 
their credibility determination, the solicitor summarized the relevant testimony. 
First, the solicitor reminded the jury of the colloquy in which the solicitor 
explicitly asked the school resource officer if he believed Victim's story, to which 
the officer "said, yeah. Yes."3  The solicitor then asserted the rape crisis counselor 
likewise interviewed Victim "face to face, eye to eye," and she believed his version 
of events as well. Specifically, the solicitor stated, "I think the expert told you that 
she has done over 200 forensic interviews.  Folks, these are people who can detect 
when someone is making something up or if there is nothing there."  The solicitor 
then reminded the jury that the police interviewed Tappeiner "face to face, eye to
eye," and that she was charged the same day with CSC with a minor, second 
degree. 
3 Trial counsel objected to this line of questioning during trial, arguing that the 
testimony improperly bolstered Victim's testimony.  However, he did not renew 
this objection when the solicitor reiterated this testimony during closing arguments.  
We note the trial court improperly admitted the initial testimony.  See State v. 
Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 358–59, 737 S.E.2d 490, 500 (2013) (stating that in child 
sex abuse cases, "it is improper for a witness to testify as to his or her opinion 
about the credibility of a child victim"). 
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In concluding, the solicitor repeatedly argued that Victim made consistent
statements throughout his "eye to eye, [] face to face discussions" with the various 
witnesses, and that the jury should "think about the eye to eye, face to face 
interviews that victim has had with law enforcement and the expert[]."  As her final 
statement to the jury, the solicitor asserted that in making their decision, the jurors 
should consider "would you let [Tappeiner] babysit your kids?  Your grand kids 
[sic]? Nieces and nephews?  I think the answer to that is why you should find her 
guilty." 
Ultimately, the jury found Tappeiner guilty of CSC with a minor, second 
degree, and the trial court sentenced Tappeiner to ten years' imprisonment, 
suspended on the service of five years' imprisonment and three years' probation.4 
The trial court also informed Tappeiner she would be placed on the sex offender 
registry for life. 
Tappeiner elected to abandon her direct appeal due to preservation problems
and proceeded to post-conviction relief. PCR counsel then filed an application for 
PCR, asserting twenty-seven grounds for relief. 
The PCR court denied relief on all counts.  However, in its order, the court
only made specific findings on four of the twenty-seven grounds, including, inter 
alia, that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to the State's allegedly 
improper remarks during closing argument.  However, the PCR court found that 
trial counsel's deficiencies did not prejudice Tappeiner. 
The State and Tappeiner filed cross-motions to alter or amend pursuant to
Rule 59(e), SCRCP. The State requested the PCR court reconsider its findings that 
trial counsel was deficient.  Tappeiner argued, inter alia, that the PCR court failed 
to make factual findings or conclusions of law on twenty-three of her twenty-seven 
allegations of ineffectiveness as required by law, and requested that the PCR court 
make such findings.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80 (2014) (stating the PCR court 
must make specific findings of fact and rulings of law). 
In response, the PCR court issued an amended order that was identical in all 
respects to the initial order, except at the end, it listed the allegations by number 
and inserted an identical paragraph under each allegation, stating:
4 Thus, at the time of this appeal, Tappeiner is no longer in prison. 
17 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Tappeiner] fails to carry her burden in proving (1) that her counsel 
failed to render reasonably effective assistance under prevailing 
professional norms, and (2) that she was prejudiced by her counsel's
ineffective performance.  Further, even if this [c]ourt were to find a 
deficiency in [trial counsel's] representation, any such deficiency did 
not prejudice the defense in that this [c]ourt does not conclude from 
reviewing the evidence that by a preponderance of the evidence the 
result of the trial would have been different. 
Tappeiner made a second motion to alter or amend, asserting the PCR court's order 
still did not comply with the requirements set forth in section 17-27-80.  However,
the PCR court denied the motion.
We granted Tappeiner's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the PCR 
court's decision.
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the PCR court err in failing to find that trial counsel's failure to object 
during the State's closing argument constituted prejudicial error? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In PCR actions, an appellate court will uphold the lower court's findings if 
there is any evidence of probative value that supports the findings.  Cherry v. State, 
300 S.C. 115, 119, 386 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1989).  However, the Court will reverse 
the PCR court's decision if it is controlled by an error of law.  Pierce v. State, 338 
S.C. 139, 145, 526 S.E.2d 222, 225 (2000).  "The burden of proof is on the 
applicant to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence."  Frasier v.
State, 351 S.C. 385, 389, 570 S.E.2d 172, 174 (2002) (citing Rule 71.1(e), 
SCRCP). 
Generally, in supporting any allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
a PCR applicant must satisfy a two-prong test.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687 (1984). First, the applicant must demonstrate that trial counsel's
performance was deficient.  Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117, 386 S.E.2d at 625.  "Under 
this prong, 'the proper measure of attorney performance remains simply 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.'"  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688) (internal alteration marks omitted); see also Franklin v. Catoe, 346 
S.C. 563, 570–71, 552 S.E.2d 718, 722 (2001) (stating that the applicant must 
18 

  
 
  
                                        
 
 
 
demonstrate that trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness). 
Second, the applicant must demonstrate that trial counsel's "deficient 
performance prejudiced the [applicant] to the extent that 'there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.'"  Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117–18, 386 S.E.2d at 625 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). "A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  Smith v. State, 386 S.C. 562, 
566, 689 S.E.2d 629, 631 (2010).5 
Courts must strongly presume that trial counsel "rendered adequate 
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable 
professional judgment."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; Edwards v. State, 392 S.C. 
449, 456, 710 S.E.2d 60, 64 (2011).  Thus, "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's
performance must be highly deferential."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
5 Upon reaching a decision, the PCR court is required to "make specific findings of 
fact, and state expressly its conclusions of law, relating to each issue presented" in
a PCR application, including whether the applicant satisfied his burden as to each 
prong of the Strickland test described above. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80; see also
Marlar v. State, 375 S.C. 407, 408, 653 S.E.2d 266, 266 (2007) (per curiam); 
McCray v. State, 305 S.C. 329, 330, 408 S.E.2d 241, 241 (1991).  Here, the PCR 
court failed to comply with these requirements, dealing with twenty-three of the 
twenty-seven grounds for relief in a summary fashion and making no factual 
findings on those issues whatsoever. 
Ordinarily, when the PCR court makes inadequate factual findings, we 
remand the matter to the PCR court for a new hearing.  See Pearson v. Harrison, 9 
Fed. App'x 85, 87 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) ("[T]he South Carolina Supreme 
Court has consistently vacated and remanded PCR court judgments that do not 
contain findings on issues presented to the PCR court . . . ." (collecting South 
Carolina Supreme Court cases) (citations omitted)).  Here, however, we find the 
PCR court should have granted Tappeiner relief on one of the very few issues it did 
make specific findings on—trial counsel's failure to object during the State's 
closing argument.  Thus, we find that a remand in this case is unnecessary. 
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LAW/ANALYSIS 
Tappeiner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
numerous instances in the State's closing argument in which the solicitor vouched 
for Victim's credibility by implying the police and rape crisis counselor believed 
Victim, and not Tappeiner.  Tappeiner further contends trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object when the solicitor appealed to the jurors' emotions 
by asking them if they would want Tappeiner babysitting their own children and 
relatives. The PCR court found trial counsel's failure to object on both issues was 
deficient, but found these errors were not prejudicial to Tappeiner, stating only that 
it did "not believe from the evidence presented there exist[ed] a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." We agree counsel's performance was deficient, but
find, contrary to the PCR court's conclusion, that these deficiencies prejudiced
Tappeiner. 
Generally, "[t]he assessment of witness credibility is within the exclusive 
province of the jury." State v. McKerley, 397 S.C. 461, 464, 725 S.E.2d 139, 141 
(Ct. App. 2012) (citing State v. Wright, 269 S.C. 414, 417, 237 S.E.2d 764, 766 
(1977)). Thus, solicitors may not vouch for a witness's credibility, as doing so 
improperly invades the province of the jury and places the government's prestige 
behind the witness.  Vaughn v. State, 362 S.C. 163, 169, 607 S.E.2d 72, 75 (2004) 
(citing State v. Shuler, 344 S.C. 604, 630, 545 S.E.2d 805, 818 (2001)) (stating that
a solicitor improperly vouches for a witness's credibility "by making explicit 
personal assurances, or indicating that information not presented to the jury 
supports the testimony"); Matthews v. State, 350 S.C. 272, 276, 565 S.E.2d 766, 
768 (2002). Thus, solicitors must confine their closing remarks to the record and 
the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Simmons v. State, 331 
S.C. 333, 338, 503 S.E.2d 164, 166 (1998). 
In keeping their closing arguments within the record, solicitors additionally
must tailor their remarks "so as not to appeal to the personal biases of the jury" or 
"arouse the jurors' passions or prejudices."  Von Dohlen v. State, 360 S.C. 598, 
609, 602 S.E.2d 738, 744 (2004).  Accordingly, solicitors should avoid comments 
that ask jurors to place themselves in the victim's—or another party's—shoes, 
because those types of comments tend to "'completely destroy all sense of 
impartiality of the jurors.'"  Brown v. State, 383 S.C. 506, 515–16, 680 S.E.2d 909, 
914 (2009) (quoting State v. Reese, 370 S.C. 31, 38, 633 S.E.2d 898, 901 (2006)).
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In assessing the propriety of remarks made during the State's closing 
argument, appellate courts must determine "whether the solicitor's comments 'so 
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
process.'" Vaughn, 362 S.C. at 169–70, 607 S.E.2d at 75 (quoting Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974)); Von Dohlen, 360 S.C. at 609, 602 
S.E.2d at 744; cf. Dawkins v. State, 346 S.C. 151, 157, 551 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2001) 
(stating that testimony that improperly corroborates a child sex victim's testimony 
has a devastating impact because of the cumulative effect of repeating the victim's
testimony, and thereby improperly bolstering the victim's credibility).  As a result 
of this inquiry, courts may occasionally apply the "invited reply" doctrine, and find 
that although a solicitor's closing argument was inappropriate, it was responsive to 
statements or arguments made by the defense, and thus did not deny the defendant 
due process. Vaughn, 362 S.C. at 169, 607 S.E.2d at 75. 
Here, we find trial counsel's closing argument did not invite the solicitor to 
repeatedly assert that the State's witnesses all believed Victim's version of events
after their "face to face, eye to eye" interviews with him.  Rather, trial counsel's 
presentation pointed out inconsistencies in the stories, which could do no more 
than invite the solicitor to point out the contradictory aspects of Victim's story and 
the other witnesses' testimony. 
Moreover, some of the solicitor's statements regarding Victim's credibility 
were not only damaging to Tappeiner, but misrepresented the evidence adduced at
trial, such as the solicitor's statement that the rape crisis counselor personally 
interviewed Victim, and that she is someone "who can detect when someone is 
making something up or if there is nothing there."  The rape crisis counselor never
testified in front of the jury that she interviewed Victim herself.6  Rather, she only 
answered the solicitor's hypothetical questions about why a child victim might 
delay reporting. Thus, the solicitor's statements were clearly improper and 
objectionable. See Matthews, 350 S.C. at 276, 565 S.E.2d at 768 ("Vouching for a 
witness based on outside material conveys the impression to the jury that the 
solicitor has evidence not presented to the jury but known by the prosecution 
which supports conviction."). Accordingly, we find there is evidence in the record 
6 At best, during cross-examination, trial counsel had her read from her "report" 
that Victim testified that he yelled during the attack, but that no one heard him. 
However, it was never explained to the jury what this report was, or whether she 
had created it by actually talking to Victim herself. 
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to support the PCR court's finding that trial counsel was deficient in failing to 
object to the solicitor's repeated vouching for Victim's credibility.
Further, the solicitor's remarks regarding whether the jurors would want 
Tappeiner babysitting their children or relatives improperly appealed to the jurors'
emotions, rather than the evidence in the record.  Cf. Brown, 383 S.C. at 512, 517,
680 S.E.2d at 912, 915 (finding the solicitor improperly appealed to the jurors'
emotions during closing argument when telling them to "speak up" for the child 
victim and "make sure that the perpetrator is punished").  Thus, we further find 
there is evidence in the record to support the PCR court's finding that trial counsel 
was deficient in failing to object to the solicitor's emotional appeal at the
conclusion of its closing arguments. 
The PCR court found neither of these deficiencies prejudiced Tappeiner, 
although it did not specify its reasoning, merely stating that the other evidence in 
the record supported Tappeiner's conviction.  Indeed, in determining prejudice, we 
frequently consider whether there is other direct or circumstantial evidence 
supporting the conviction, notwithstanding trial counsel's deficient performance.
See Brown, 383 S.C. at 518, 680 S.E.2d at 916 (finding that the solicitor's improper 
appeal to the jury's emotions was not prejudicial in light of the fact that there were 
four unrelated, adult witnesses to the defendant's rape of the child victim, as well 
as other direct evidence that a rape occurred); Simmons, 331 S.C. at 338, 503 
S.E.2d at 166 (stating that appellate courts must consider the impropriety of the
solicitor's argument in the context of the entire record, including whether there is
overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt).
Here, as the parties freely admitted during trial, the case was entirely
dependent on a credibility determination between the prosecution's witnesses and 
the defense's witness.  Given the dearth of evidence beyond Victim's assertions, we 
cannot say evidence of Tappeiner's guilt was overwhelming.  Therefore, we find 
that but-for the improper vouching for Victim's credibility, there is a reasonable 
likelihood the outcome of the trial would have been different, and Tappeiner was 
thus prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to object.  Cf. State v. Jennings, 394 S.C. 
473, 480, 716 S.E.2d 91, 94–95 (2011) ("There was no physical evidence presented 
in this case. The only evidence presented by the State was the children's accounts 
of what occurred and other hearsay evidence of the children's accounts.  Because 
the children's credibility was the most critical determination of this case, we find 
the admission of the written reports was not harmless."); Dawkins, 346 S.C. at 157 
n.7, 551 S.E.2d at 263 n.7 ("This strategy [of improperly corroborating Victim's 
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version of events] was inappropriate especially given the fact there was no 
overwhelming evidence that petitioner sexually abused Chambless.").7 
Similarly, given the lack of physical evidence, the solicitor's emotional plea 
that Tappeiner was a bad actor and could not be trusted to watch the jurors' own
family members is reasonably likely to have had a substantially stronger impact 
than would be the case in a trial where there was additional, independent evidence 
of the defendant's guilt.  See, e.g., Brown, 383 S.C. at 518, 680 S.E.2d at 916 
(finding the improper appeal to the jurors' emotions was not prejudicial when 
other, overwhelming evidence supported the child victim's assertion that she was 
raped by the defendant).8  As a result, we find it likely the emotional plea, 
particularly in conjunction with the solicitor's improper vouching for Victim's
credibility, swayed the jurors' view of the facts and resolution of the contradictions 
in the witnesses' testimonies. 
Accordingly, we find there is no evidence in the record to support the PCR 
court's conclusion that Tappeiner was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failures to
object during the State's closing arguments.  To the contrary, the solicitor's
repeated vouching for Victim's credibility and her emotional plea to the jurors was 
incredibly prejudicial to Tappeiner because there was no other evidence beyond 
Victim's testimony of the events that allegedly occurred that August evening.  We 
7 See also, e.g., Vaughn, 362 S.C. at 170, 607 S.E.2d at 75 ("Here, if not for the
lack of evidence, we might agree that the solicitor was merely responding to the 
petitioner's argument." (emphasis added)); Matthews, 350 S.C. at 276–77, 565 
S.E.2d at 768 ("The solicitor's summation led the jury to believe the government 
corroborated the witness'[s] testimony before trial and found it credible.  The 
solicitor did not support this vouching with anything within the record, such as 
corroboration by other witnesses or physical evidence.  The solicitor improperly
vouched for the witness." (emphasis added)); cf. State v. Chavis, 412 S.C. 101, 
110–11, 771 S.E.2d 336, 341 (2015) (finding a witness's bolstering of the child 
victim's testimony harmless because there were witnesses to and physical evidence 
of the rape, and therefore the case did not turn solely on the child victim's 
credibility (citations omitted)). 
8 Moreover, the emotional plea was the very last thing the jury heard before
beginning its deliberations, and connected the jurors personally to the alleged
abuse in the case. Thus, the comment was likely at the forefront of the jurors' 
minds when beginning their discussions.
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therefore reverse the PCR court's finding that trial counsel's failure to object during 
closing arguments was not prejudicial, and grant Tappeiner a new trial due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel.9 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the PCR court and grant Tappeiner a 
new trial. 
REVERSED. 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE and FEW, JJ., concur. 
9 Tappeiner raises two other issues on appeal, including whether the PCR court 
erred in failing to find prejudice in trial counsel's failure to object to the State's 
references to Tappeiner's suppressed confession, and whether the PCR court erred 
in failing to find trial counsel ineffective for failing to adequately prepare and 
present a defense on Tappeiner's behalf. However, because the closing argument 
issues are dispositive, we decline to address the remaining issues on appeal.  Futch 
v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 
(1999).
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JUSTICE HEARN: Melvin P. Stukes appeals his conviction for criminal 
sexual conduct (CSC) and first degree burglary, arguing the court of appeals erred 
in affirming the trial court's jury instruction that Victim's testimony need not be 
corroborated by additional evidence or testimony pursuant to Section 16-3-657 of 
the South Carolina Code (2003).1  We reverse and hold instructing the jury on this 
statute is an impermissible charge on the facts and therefore unconstitutional.  We 
further overrule our precedent condoning this instruction. 
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On the evening of May 10, 2004, Victim arrived at her friend Jaqueline 
Bruton's home and informed her she had been sexually assaulted that evening. 
Bruton encouraged Victim to seek medical care and brought Victim to the 
Lexington Medical Center for an exam. At the hospital, Victim underwent a 
sexual assault examination, which included an interview, the collection of her 
clothing, and a vaginal swab. Although there was no sign of pelvic or vaginal
injury, Victim did display some redness on her face around her cheek and eye, as
well as around her neck. 
By January 2005, a DNA profile was developed based on a sample obtained
from Victim's underwear, but no match was found.  Then, in June 2007, the DNA 
profile was finally matched to an individual—Stukes.  The police attempted to 
locate Victim, but did not discover her whereabouts until early 2010, when a cold 
case team began investigating the matter.  Finally, in May 2010, police arrested 
Stukes. He denied knowing Victim after being shown a picture of her and stated 
he had only had sex with two white women, and she was not one of them. 
However, when confronted with the evidence of her DNA, he admitted he must 
have had sex with her. He was ultimately charged with CSC and burglary; the case
proceeded to trial before a jury. 
At trial, Victim testified that on the evening of the incident she was getting 
ready for work around 9:30 p.m. when she heard a knock at the door.  Upon 
opening the door, a man grabbed her throat and punched her in the face, causing 
her to stumble and fall over the side of her couch.  She believed she blacked out 
after falling, and the next thing she remembered was her face being shoved into the 
 Section 16-3-657 provides, "[t]he testimony of the victim need not be 
corroborated in prosecutions [for criminal sexual conduct]." 
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pillows on her couch and a pain in her vaginal area as she was being raped.  After 
blacking out again, Victim testified that once she regained consciousness, the man
was gone and her clothes were down around her ankles.  Victim stated she tried to 
call Bruton, but when she did not answer, she drove to Bruton's home.  Victim 
could not identify the attacker, but denied ever having consensual sex with Stukes.2 
Stukes testified in his own defense.  He stated he met Victim at a friend's
apartment in the complex where she lived.  After flirting awhile, Stukes alleged 
Victim invited him back to her apartment, where they ultimately ended up having 
sex. 
During the jury charge conference, Stukes objected to the instruction on
section 16-3-657, arguing it violated his right to equal protection and amounted to 
an impermissible comment on the facts.  The trial court denied the request and 
included this statement in its charge: "The testimony of a victim in a criminal 
sexual conduct prosecution need not be corroborated by other testimony or 
evidence," in addition to the general charge on credibility determinations.   
During the course of deliberations, the jury submitted a number of questions 
to the trial court, including: "the South Carolina law that the victim's testimony in 
CSC . . . does not need to be corroborated, . . . does that law imply that the victim's
testimony must be accepted as being true?"  In response, the court simply 
recharged the general law on credibility determinations.  The jury almost 
immediately returned with a verdict, finding Stukes guilty of burglary and CSC. 
He was sentenced to twenty-five years.    
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion.  State v.
Stukes, Op. No. 2015-UP-014 (S.C. Ct. App. filed January 14, 2015).  This Court
granted certiorari.
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the court of appeals err in affirming the trial court's charge that a 
victim's testimony need not be corroborated by additional evidence? 
2 When Victim was shown a photo lineup, she indicated that Stukes "looked 
familiar" but she could not say she knew him.  
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LAW/ANALYSIS 
Stukes argues the trial court erred in charging section 16-3-657 on the basis 
that a victim's testimony need not be corroborated with additional evidence.  We 
agree this constitutes an impermissible charge on the facts and overrule the 
precedent to contrary. 
Jury instructions should be designed to enlighten the jury and aid it in 
arriving at a correct verdict. State v. Leonard, 292 S.C. 133, 137, 355 S.E.2d 270, 
273 (1987). Regardless of whether the charge is a correct statement of the law, 
instructions which confuse or mislead the jury are erroneous.  Id.  When reviewing 
a jury charge for error, an appellate court considers the charge as a whole; the 
charge must be prejudicial to the appellant to warrant a new trial.  State v. Curry, 
406 S.C. 364, 373, 752 S.E.2d 263, 267 (2013). 
In State v. Rayfield, 369 S.C. 106, 631 S.E.2d 244 (2006), this Court
affirmed the trial court's charge of section 16-3-657.  In so holding, the Court 
considered not only the entirety of the jury charge, but also the legislative intent 
behind enactment of the statute. Id. at 117–18, 631 S.E.2d at 250. The Court 
initially opined that section 16-3-657 "prevents trial or appellate courts from 
finding a lack of sufficient evidence to support a conviction simply because the 
alleged victim's testimony is not corroborated."  Id. at 117, 631 S.E.2d at 250.
However, the Court went further and held that in enacting section 16-3-657:
the Legislature recognized that crimes involving criminal sexual 
conduct fall within a unique category of offenses against the person. 
In many cases, the only witnesses to a rape or sexual assault are the 
perpetrator and the victim.  An investigation may or may not reveal 
physical or forensic evidence identifying a particular perpetrator.  The 
Legislature has decided it is reasonable and appropriate in [CSC] 
cases to make abundantly clear—not only to the judge but also to the 
jury—that a defendant may be convicted solely on the basis of a 
victim's testimony. 
Id.  Accordingly, the Court held that while a trial court is not required to charge 
section 16-3-657, if it does, the charge is not reversible error provided this
instruction is "not unduly emphasized and the charge as a whole comports with the 
law." Id. at 117–18, 631 S.E.2d at 250. 
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Then-Justice Pleicones dissented and would have found the charge 
reversible error. Under his view of the legislative intent, the statute is not the 
proper subject of a charge, but merely serves to guide trial and appellate courts in 
analyzing the sufficiency of evidence. Id. at 119, 631 S.E.2d at 251 (Pleicones, J.,
dissenting). Additionally, he noted this charge "has the potential for creating more 
problems than solutions, for it might cause confusion when read with the general
charge on witness credibility." Id. at 120, 631 S.E.2d at 251 (internal citations 
omitted).  Furthermore, he noted that placing this emphasis on the victim's
testimony appeared to be a comment on the facts by the court.  Id. at 120, 631 
S.E.2d at 252.
We are persuaded by the dissent in Rayfield and conclude this charge is 
confusing and violative of the constitutional provision prohibiting courts from 
commenting to the jury on the facts of a case.  See S.C. Const. art. V, § 21 ("Judges 
shall not charge juries in respect to matters of fact, but shall declare the law."). 
Accordingly, it is not within the province of the court to express an opinion to the 
jury on its view of the facts.  By addressing the veracity of a victim's testimony in 
its instructions, the trial court emphasizes the weight of that evidence in the eyes of 
the jury. The charge invites the jury to believe the victim, explaining that to 
confirm the authenticity of her statement, the jury need only hear her speak.3 
Moreover, it is inescapable that this charge confused the jury.  Specifying this
3 Our holding is in accord with a number of other jurisdictions which have likewise 
determined this charge is improper.  See Gutierrez v. State, 177 So. 3d 226, 231–32 
(Fla. 2015) ("It cannot be gainsaid that any statement by the judge that suggests 
one witness's testimony need not be subjected to the same tests for weight or 
credibility as the testimony of others has the unfortunate effect of bolstering that 
witness's testimony by according it special status.  The instruction in this case did
just that, and in the process effectively placed the judge's thumb on the scale to
lend an extra element of weight to the victim's testimony."); Ludy v. State, 784 
N.E.2d 459, 462 (Ind. 2003) (finding charge overemphasized testimony of victim
and was both confusing and misleading); Veteto v. State, 8 S.W.3d 805, 816 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2000) abrogated on other grounds by State v. Crook, 248 S.W.3d 172 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (finding jury charge amounted to a comment on the weight
of the evidence and was therefore improper). But see Gaxiola v. State, 119 P.3d 
1225, 1232 (Nev. 2005) (upholding "no corroboration' instruction," and finding it
"does not tell the jury to give a victim's testimony greater weight, it simply informs 
the jury that corroboration is not required by law").   
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qualification applies to one witness creates the inference the same is not true for 
the others. This confusion is illustrated by the jury's query as to whether our law 
implies a victim's testimony must be accepted as being true. In our view the trial 
court's decision to merely recharge credibility, as opposed to answer the question 
in the negative, did nothing to inform the jury on this issue.     
Furthermore, we do not believe this case is amenable to a harmless error 
analysis. Our review of the record indicates this case hinged on credibility. 
Victim said it was rape; he said it was consensual.  The jury was clearly confused
as to whether it was required to accept Victim's testimony as truth.  We therefore
cannot say the error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.4 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we overrule our precedent to the extent it condones 
the use of section 16-3-657 as a jury charge.5  Additionally, we find the error here 
was not harmless and reverse and remand for a new trial.  
PLEICONES, C.J., and BEATTY, J., concur.  KITTREDGE, J., dissenting in 
a separate opinion in which Acting Justice James E. Moore, concurs. 
4 While we appreciate the existence of conflicting facts as illuminated in the 
dissent, we would hesitate to call the evidence against Stukes overwhelming.  The 
testimony highlighted by the dissent boils down to those witnesses' perception (i.e., 
credibility assessments) of Victim.  Therefore, we disagree that the error in 
charging section 16-3-657 can be saved by analyzing the charge as a whole.   
5 This includes, but may not be limited to, State v. Rayfield, 369 S.C. 106, 631 
S.E.2d 244 (2006); State v. Schumpert, 312 S.C. 502, 435 S.E.2d 859 (1993); State
v. Hill, 394 S.C. 280, 715 S.E.2d 368 (Ct. App. 2011); and State v. Orozco, 392 
S.C. 212, 708 S.E.2d 227 (Ct. App. 2011).  Therefore, our ruling is effective in this 
case and those which are pending on direct review or are not yet final, but not in
post-conviction relief. 
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 JUSTICE KITTREDGE: I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the court of 
appeals in result. 
I agree with the majority that we should no longer approve the no-corroboration 
charge, but I would find any error in the trial court's decision to give the charge in 
this case harmless.  Contrary to the majority's portrayal, the evidence presented in 
this case was much more than "he said, she said."  Multiple witnesses testified to 
the assault's physical and emotional impact on the victim.  Jacqueline Bruton, the 
victim's friend, saw the victim shortly after the victim's encounter with Stukes.  
Bruton testified there was a handprint on the victim's face or neck after the attack, 
matching the victim's version of the attack.  Bruton observed that the victim 
appeared "afraid."  Investigator Brian Metz of the Richland County Sheriff's 
Department (the RCSD), who spoke with the victim at the hospital, described the 
victim's demeanor as "withdrawn."  Donna Sharpe, the ER nurse who examined 
the victim with a rape kit, described the victim as "nervous and tearful."  Sharpe 
testified the victim "would withdraw from any kind of touch" and was "anxious 
and gripping the bed and tearful" when she underwent a pelvic examination.  
Sharpe's notes also described a bruise and redness on the victim's face and what 
appeared to be a hand mark on the victim's neck.  Finally, Sergeant Brian Godfrey 
of the RCSD testified that the victim was "visibly upset and crying" when he spoke 
with her about the incident in March 2010, nearly six years after it occurred.  These 
witnesses' testimony is consistent with the victim's, in which she described a brutal 
assault that included being grabbed by the throat and punched in the face. 
In addition to the evidence corroborating the victim's testimony, the jury was 
presented with Stukes's inconsistent statements.  Stukes initially denied knowing 
the victim, much less having had sex with her.  When pressed with the evidence, 
including the DNA match, Stukes remembered the victim and that they had 
consensual sex. Therefore, abundant evidence in addition to the victim's testimony 
was presented to the jury. 
Also conspicuously absent from the majority opinion is the trial court's full jury 
charge on credibility.  "[J]ury instructions should be considered as a whole, and if 
as a whole they are free from error, any isolated portions which may be misleading 
do not constitute reversible error." State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20, 27, 538 S.E.2d 
248, 251 (2000) (citing State v. Smith, 315 S.C. 547, 554, 446 S.E.2d 411, 415 
(1994)). "A jury charge which is substantially correct and covers the law does not 
require reversal." State v. Brandt, 393 S.C. 526, 549, 713 S.E.2d 591, 603 (2011) 
(citing State v. Foust, 325 S.C. 12, 16, 479 S.E.2d 50, 52 (1996)).   
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In this case, the trial court charged the jury, in relevant part, as follows: 
The testimony of a victim in a criminal sexual conduct 
prosecution need not be corroborated by other testimony or evidence.  
Necessarily, you must determine the credibility of witnesses who have 
testified in this case. Credibility simply means believability.  It 
becomes your duty as jurors to analyze and to evaluate the evidence 
and determine which evidence convinces you of its truth.
In determining the believability of witnesses who have testified 
in this case, you may believe one witness over several witnesses or 
several witnesses over one witness. You may believe a part of . . . the 
testimony of the witness and reject the remaining part of the testimony 
of that same witness. You may believe the testimony of a witness in 
its entirety, or you may reject the testimony of a witness in its entirety. 
You may consider whether any witness has exhibited to you an 
interest, bias, prejudice, or other motives in this case.  You may also 
consider the appearance and manner of a witness while on the witness 
stand. 
(emphasis added).  When the jury asked for clarification, the trial court instructed 
the jury that "you must determine the credibility of all witnesses who have testified 
in this case. . . . [Y]ou may believe one witness over several witnesses, or several 
witnesses over one witness."  (emphasis added).   
The trial court noted that its second charge made it clear the jury was to consider 
the credibility of every witness who testified, which necessarily included the 
victim. Therefore, when viewed in their entirety, the charges properly instructed 
the jury that it was to subject the victim's testimony to the same scrutiny as that of 
other witnesses. Thus, any error in giving the no-corroboration charge was cured 
by the full witness-credibility instructions. 
In short, given the substantial corroborating evidence and the trial court's extensive 
credibility instructions, any error was harmless.  The result reached by the court of 
appeals, and therefore Stukes's convictions and sentences, should be affirmed.  
Acting Justice James E. Moore, concurs.
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On January 28, 2016, the following orders were submitted to the General 
Assembly pursuant to Article V, § 4A of the South Carolina Constitution: 
(1) An order amending Rule 267(d) of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules and Rule 10(d) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) An order amending Rule 11 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
(3) An order amending Rule 23 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
(4) An order amending Rules 1, 4, 20, 23, and 24 of the South Carolina 
Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules.  
Since ninety days have passed since submission without rejection by the General 
Assembly, the amendments contained in the above orders are effective 
immediately. 
 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  C.J. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina
 
Re: Rule Amendments 
Appellate Case Nos. 2015-001468; 2015-002219;  
2014-002497; 2015-002643 
ORDER 
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s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
s/ John Cannon Few  J. 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
April 27, 2016 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
 
Re: Proposed Amendments to the South Carolina 
Appellate Court Rules and the South Carolina Rules of 
Civil Procedure 
Appellate Case No. 2015-001468 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Article V, § 4 of the South Carolina Constitution, Rule 267(d), South 
Carolina Appellate Court Rules, and Rule 10(d), South Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure, are amended as set forth in the attachment to this order.  These 
amendments shall be submitted to the General Assembly as provided in Article V, 
§ 4A of the South Carolina Constitution. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones C.J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
January 28, 2016 
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Rule 267(d), South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, is amended to provide:
(d) Margins and Bindings. Typewritten papers or reproductions must 
have a blank margin of one inch on all sides. If more than two sheets 
are used, they shall be securely fastened on the left margin. While 
petitions or motions need not be bound, Records on Appeal, 
Appendices in post-conviction relief matters and briefs must be bound 
in volumes not exceeding 250 sheets each. If staples or clasps are used 
to bind the volumes, the spines of the volumes shall be bound with 
heavy tape. One copy of every Final Brief, Record on Appeal, 
Supplemental Record, or Appendix filed with the appellate court shall 
be filed unbound. 
Rule 10(d), South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, is amended to provide: 
(d) Manner of Preparing Papers. With the exception of court-
approved forms, pleadings and other papers shall be on eight and one-
half by eleven inches in size paper. They shall be plainly written with 
adequate spacing between lines or typewritten with not less than one 
and one-half spacing between lines, except for indented quotations or 
footnotes. Papers must have a blank margin of a minimum of one inch 
on all sides. Type for captions, text, and footnotes shall be a minimum
size of twelve-point type. Each page shall be numbered consecutively 
and pages shall be fastened at the top so as to read continuously. Page 
numbers and document identification footers may appear in margins 
and sized smaller than twelve-point type. Plats, photographs, 
diagrams, documents, and other paper exhibits or copies thereof may 
be submitted in their actual size; they should be reduced if practicable 
to eight and one-half by eleven inches if such reduction does not 
impair legibility and clarity. 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
 
Re: Amendments to South Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure 
Appellate Case No. 2015-002219 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Article V, § 4, of the South Carolina Constitution, Rule 11 of the South 
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure is hereby amended as provided in the attachment 
to this order. These amendments shall be submitted to the General Assembly as 
provided by Art. V, § 4A of the South Carolina Constitution.
s/ Costa M. Pleicones C.J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
January 28, 2016 
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 The first paragraph of Rule 11(a), South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, is 
amended to provide as follows: 
 
 
RULE 11 
SIGNING OF PLEADINGS; ATTORNEYS 
 
(a) Signature. Every pleading, motion or other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be signed in his individual name by at 
least one attorney of record who is admitted to practice law in South 
Carolina, and whose address and telephone number shall be stated. A 
party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, 
motion or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise 
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified 
or accompanied by affidavit. The written or electronic signature of an 
attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the 
pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, 
information and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is 
not interposed for delay. An attorney or party may only utilize an 
electronic signature in pleadings, motions or other papers that are E-
Filed in the SCE-File electronic filing system. 
 
Note to 2016 Amendment: 
 
This amendment clarifies that the electronic signature of an attorney 
or party may only be used in E-Filed pleadings, motions or other 
papers. 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
 
Re: Amendments to the South Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure 
Appellate Case No. 2014-002497 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Article V, § 4, of the South Carolina Constitution, the South Carolina 
Rules of Civil Procedure are hereby amended as provided in the attachment to this 
order. These amendments shall be submitted to the General Assembly as provided 
by Art. V, § 4A of the South Carolina Constitution. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones C.J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
January 28, 2016 
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 Rule 23, South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, is amended by adding Paragraph 
(e), which provides: 
 
(e) Disposition of Residual Funds. 
 
(1) "Residual Funds" are funds that remain after the payment of all approved 
class member claims, expenses, litigation costs, attorneys' fees, and other 
court-approved disbursements to implement the relief granted. Nothing in 
this rule is intended to limit the parties to a class action from suggesting, or 
the trial court from approving, a settlement that does not create residual 
funds. 
 
(2) Any order, judgment, or approved compromise in a class action under 
this rule that establishes a process for identifying and compensating 
members of the class may provide for the disbursement of residual funds. In 
matters where the claims process has been exhausted and residual funds 
remain, not less than fifty percent of residuals must be distributed to the 
South Carolina Bar Foundation to support activities and programs that 
promote access to the civil justice system for low income residents of South 
Carolina. The court may disburse the balance of any residual funds beyond 
the minimum percentage to the South Carolina Bar Foundation to any other 
entity or entities for purposes that have a direct or indirect relationship to the 
objectives of the underlying litigation or otherwise promote the substantive 
and procedural interests of members of the class. 
 
Note to 2016 Amendment: 
 
This amendment directs that a portion of any residual funds in a class action 
matter be distributed to the South Carolina Bar Foundation to promote 
access to the civil justice system for low income residents of South Carolina.  
However, the rule does not require that parties create residual funds as part 
of any class action settlement. 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
  
Re: Amendments to the South Carolina Court-Annexed 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-002643 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Article V, § 4 of the South Carolina Constitution, Rules 1, 4, 20, 23, 
and 24 of the South Carolina Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules 
are amended as set forth in the attachment to this order.  These amendments shall 
be submitted to the General Assembly as provided in Article V, § 4A of the South 
Carolina Constitution. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones C.J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
January 28, 2016 
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 Rule 1(a)(1) of the South Carolina Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Rules (ADR Rules) is amended to provide: 
 
Rule 1
  
Scope of Rules 

 
These rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, inexpensive 
and collaborative resolution in every action to which they apply.  
These rules govern Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes 
in the courts of this State as follows: 
 
(a) With the exceptions stated in Rule 3, these rules govern court-
annexed ADR processes in South Carolina Circuit Courts in civil 
suits, and in South Carolina Family Courts in domestic relations 
actions: 
 
 (1) in all counties in South Carolina;[1] 
 
 (2) as required by statute; or 
 
 (3) as ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
 
.    .    . 
 
[1] See Supreme Court Order dated November 12, 2015. 
 
 
Rule 4(a) and (b), ADR Rules, is amended to provide: 
 
Rule 4
  
Selection or Appointment of Neutral 

 
(a) Eligibility. A neutral may be a person who: 
 
 (1) is a certified neutral under Rule 19; or 
 
(2) is not a certified neutral but, in the opinion of all the parties 
is otherwise qualified by training or experience to mediate, 
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arbitrate or evaluate all or some of the issues in the action. If the 
person is not a certified neutral, he or she must disclose the lack 
of certification and obtain written consent from all parties to the 
ADR Conference on a form approved by the Supreme Court or 
its designee. 
 
(b) Roster of Certified Neutrals. The Board shall maintain a current 
roster ("Roster") of neutrals certified under Rule 19 who are willing to 
serve in each county. The Board shall make the Roster available to the 
clerks of court for each county. A certified neutral shall notify the 
Supreme Court's Board of Arbitrator and Mediator Certification if the 
neutral desires to be added to or deleted from the Roster. The Board 
and clerk of court for each county shall make this roster available to 
the public. 
 
 
Rule 20(b)(1)(A), ADR Rules, is amended to provide: 
 
(A) A minimum of four (4) hours of substantive family law 
instruction, to include statutes, rules and practice concerning family 
and related law in South Carolina, including the law regarding 
custody, visitation, support, division of property and alimony; 
 
 
Rule 23, ADR Rules, is amended to provide: 
 
Rule 23 
Local Rule-Making 
 
These rules shall be uniform for all counties. Local rules may be 
allowed only upon approval of the Supreme Court. Unless otherwise 
specified by these rules, all motions related to ADR or to these rules 
should be directed to the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes. 
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 Rule 24, ADR Rules, is amended to provide: 
 
Rule 24 
Application of Rules 
 
These rules shall apply to cases filed in circuit or family court on or after the 
effective date of any Supreme Court order designating that county or court as 
subject to these rules. 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
Re: Expansion of Electronic Filing Pilot Program - Court of 
Common Pleas 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-002439 
ORDER
Pursuant to the provisions of Article V, Section 4 of the South Carolina Constitution, 
 
IT IS ORDERED that the Pilot Program for the Electronic Filing (E-Filing) of 
documents in the Court of Common Pleas, which was established by Order dated 
December 1, 2015, is expanded to include Pickens County.  Effective May 3, 2016, all 
filings in all common pleas cases commenced or pending in Pickens County must be 
E-Filed if the party is represented by an attorney, unless the type of case or the type of 
filing is excluded from the Pilot Program.  The counties currently designated for 
mandatory E-Filing are as follows:   
 
Clarendon Lee Greenville 
Sumter  Williamsburg  Pickens—Effective May 3, 2016  
 
Attorneys should refer to the South Carolina Electronic Filing Policies and 
Guidelines, which were adopted by the Supreme Court on October 28, 2015, and the 
training materials available at http://www.sccourts.org/efiling/ to determine whether 
any specific filings are exempted from the requirement that they be E-Filed.  
Attorneys who have cases pending in Pilot Counties are strongly encouraged to 
review, and to instruct their staff to review, the training materials available on the E-
Filing Portal. 
s/Costa M. Pleicones   
Costa M. Pleicones 
Chief Justice of South Carolina 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
April 26, 2016 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Palmetto Mortuary Transport, Inc., Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
Knight Systems, Inc. and Robert L. Knight, Appellants. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2014-001819 
Appeal From Lexington County 

James Randall Davis, Special Referee 

Opinion No. 5402 

Heard February 10, 2016 – Filed May 4, 2016 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 
Reginald I. Lloyd, of Lloyd Law Firm, LLC, of Camden, 
and Christopher Todd Hagins, of The Hagins Law Firm, 
LLC, of Columbia, for Appellants.  
John Julius Pringle, Jr. and Lyndey Ritz Zwingelberg, 
both of Adams and Reese LLP, of Columbia, for 
Respondent. 
WILLIAMS, J.: Knight Systems, Inc. (Knight Systems) and Robert L. "Buddy" 
Knight (collectively "Appellants") appeal the special referee's order ruling in favor 
of Palmetto Mortuary Transport, Inc. (Palmetto).  Appellants argue the special 
referee erred in failing to find (1) the geographic restriction in the parties' covenant 
not to compete (the Covenant) is unreasonable and void, (2) the Covenant's
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territorial restriction is unsupported by independent and valuable consideration, (3) 
the Covenant is void as a matter of public policy, and (4) the Covenant became 
void after any breach by Palmetto.  We reverse and remand. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Knight Systems, owned and operated by Buddy, engaged primarily in the mortuary 
transport business until 2007. On January 5, 2007, Knight Systems entered into an 
asset purchase agreement (the Agreement) with Palmetto, a business owned by 
Donald and Ellen Lintal. Pursuant to the Agreement, Knight Systems sold various 
tangible assets, goodwill, and customer accounts—including body removal service 
contracts with Richland County, Lexington County, and the University of South 
Carolina—to Palmetto in exchange for a purchase price of $590,000.  The 
Agreement also contained an exclusive sales provision that obligated Palmetto to 
purchase body bags at specified discounted prices from Knight Systems for ten 
years. The provision listed four types of body bags: heavy duty, lightweight, odor-
proof, and water retrieval.  
In addition to the Agreement, Palmetto executed the Covenant with Appellants.  In 
consideration of $1,000, Appellants agreed not to provide mortuary transport 
services within 150 miles of their business—located in Lexington County—for ten 
years following the closing date of the sale. 
The subject of dispute in the instant ligation began in June 2011, when Richland 
County issued a request for proposal (RFP) seeking mortuary transport services 
from a provider for a period of five years. At that time, Palmetto still held the 
services contract with Richland County as a result of the Agreement.  Palmetto 
timely submitted a response to the RFP.   
On June 16, 2011, one day before responses to the RFP were due, Buddy recorded 
a telephone conversation he had with Donald Lintal.  In that conversation, Buddy 
accused Palmetto of breaching the Agreement by buying infant body bags from
other manufacturers in 2008. Donald relayed that he did not believe these 
purchases were significant and he was "not trying to get around" the Agreement.  
Donald claimed the amount of bags Palmetto purchased from sources other than 
Knight Systems only totaled $884.97.  This amount included thirty-one infant body 
bags at $192.75, four extra-large body bags at $213.72, six heavy duty body bags 
at $208.50, and six water retrieval body bags at $270.
47
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Donald, however, asserted that because infant and extra-large body bags were not 
the type of bags Palmetto was required to purchase from Knight Systems pursuant 
to the Agreement, the total amount Palmetto paid for body bags falling within the 
exclusive sales provision was $478.50.  In comparison, from January 2007 to June 
2011, Palmetto purchased more than $45,000 worth of body bags from Knight 
Systems under the Agreement.  Therefore, Donald contended the sales that 
allegedly violated the Agreement constituted less than 1% of Palmetto's overall 
purchases from Knight Systems.
After this telephone conversation, Buddy consulted with his attorney and submitted 
a response to the RFP on June 17, 2011.  Buddy stated he felt Knight Systems 
would be "left out in the cold" by Palmetto's alleged breach of contract.  After the 
RFP deadline passed, Buddy contacted an official at the Richland County 
Procurement Office, seeking a determination that Knight Systems be awarded the 
mortuary transport services contract because it was the only provider of odor-proof 
body bags required by the RFP. Buddy also informed the official that Knight 
Systems would be taking all of its odor-proof body bags off the market.  Although 
Palmetto asserted its response to the RFP contained the lowest price for services 
and had the highest total of points from the Richland County Procurement Office, 
Richland County awarded Knight Systems the mortuary transport services contract 
for a five-year term. 
On October 26, 2011, Palmetto filed a complaint against Appellants.  On June 6, 
2013, Palmetto amended its complaint and included causes of action for breach of 
contract, breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, and intentional 
interference with prospective contractual relations.  Palmetto alleged Appellants 
breached the Covenant by providing mortuary transport services within the 
restricted 150-mile radius of Lexington County.  Palmetto also claimed Buddy 
intentionally made false representations to Richland County that Knight Systems 
had the exclusive ability to supply odor-proof body bags—as required by the 
RFP—because Knight Systems was obligated under the Agreement to sell the 
odor-proof bags to Palmetto. 
Appellants answered and counterclaimed for breach of contract on July 2, 2013.  
According to Appellants, Palmetto first breached the Agreement by purchasing 
body bags from another source in violation of the exclusive sales provision.  
Appellants also contended the Covenant was unenforceable because it was not 
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supported by adequate consideration and contained unreasonable restrictions in 
duration and geographic scope.  
By consent order, the case was referred to a court-appointed special referee and 
tried on December 18, 2013.  In an order issued on July 22, 2014, the special 
referee ruled in favor of Palmetto.  The special referee found the Covenant was 
supported by valuable consideration and reasonably limited in time and geographic 
scope. Further, the special referee held Appellants breached the Agreement by 
refusing to make the odor-proof bags available for purchase and violated the 
Covenant by submitting a response to the Richland County RFP.  Lastly, the 
special referee found Palmetto's purchase of body bags from other manufacturers 
did not constitute a material breach of the Agreement that excused Appellants'
performance of their contractual duties.   
In light of his rulings, the special referee ordered Appellants to pay attorney's fees 
and damages of $373,264.54 in lost profits resulting from their wrongful 
competition with Palmetto.  The special referee also ordered Palmetto to pay 
damages of $478.50 to Appellants for purchasing body bags in violation of the 
exclusive sales provision.  Finally, the special referee issued a permanent
injunction against Appellants, requiring them to comply with the terms of the 
Covenant for a term of five years and seven months following the date of his order,
with the exception of their performance of the services contract with Richland 
County. This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"When legal and equitable actions are maintained in one suit, this court is 
presented with a divided scope of review, and each action retains its own identity 
as legal or equitable for purposes of review on appeal."  Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 
1, 17, 640 S.E.2d 486, 495 (Ct. App. 2006). 
"A breach of contract action is an action at law."  Madden v. Bent Palm Invs., LLC, 
386 S.C. 459, 464, 688 S.E.2d 597, 599 (Ct. App. 2010).  "[W]hen reviewing an 
action at law, on appeal of a case tried without a jury, the appellate court's 
jurisdiction is limited to correction of errors at law, and the appellate court will not 
disturb the [special referee]'s findings of fact as long as they are reasonably 
supported by the evidence." Ritter & Assocs., Inc. v. Buchanan Volkswagen, Inc., 
405 S.C. 643, 649, 748 S.E.2d 801, 804 (Ct. App. 2013) (alterations in original) 
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(quoting Mazloom v. Mazloom, 382 S.C. 307, 316, 675 S.E.2d 746, 751 (Ct. App. 
2009)). "[T]he interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law, as is 
the question of whether a non-competition clause is reasonable."  Baugh v. 
Columbia Heart Clinic, P.A., 402 S.C. 1, 12, 738 S.E.2d 480, 486 (Ct. App. 2013).   
Actions for injunctive relief sound in equity. Denman v. City of Columbia, 387 
S.C. 131, 140, 691 S.E.2d 465, 470 (2010).  "In equitable actions, an appellate 
court may review the record and make findings of fact in accordance with its own 
view of the preponderance of the evidence."  Id.
LAW/ANALYSIS  
I. Geographic Scope 
Appellants contend the special referee erred in finding the Covenant's territorial 
restriction of a 150-mile radius was reasonable and enforceable.  We agree. 
In South Carolina, our courts will generally uphold and enforce a covenant not to 
compete arising out of the sale of a business if it is (1) reasonably limited as to 
time and territory, (2) supported by valuable consideration, and (3) not detrimental 
to the public interest.  S.C. Fin. Corp. of Anderson v. West Side Fin. Co., 236 S.C. 
109, 119, 113 S.E.2d 329, 334 (1960). 
This court will uphold a geographic restriction in a covenant not to compete 
ancillary to the sale of a business if it is "reasonably restricted as to the place of 
territory" and is no "more enlarged than essential for a reasonable protection of the 
rights of the purchasing party." Metts v. Wenberg, 158 S.C. 411, 415, 155 S.E. 
734, 735 (1930). To determine whether a territorial restriction in a covenant not to 
compete is reasonable, the court must examine (1) the whole subject matter of the 
contract, (2) the kind and character of the business, (3) its location, (4) the purpose 
to be accomplished by the restriction, and (5) all circumstances showing the 
intentions of the parties in making the contract. Reeves v. Sargeant, 200 S.C. 494, 
501, 21 S.E.2d 184, 188 (1942).  Therefore, we must naturally decide each case on 
its own facts. Id. at 502, 21 S.E.2d at 188. South Carolina does not follow the 
"blue pencil" rule and, thus, "restrictions in a non-compete clause cannot be 
rewritten by a court or limited by the parties' agreement, but must stand or fall on 
their own terms."  Poynter Invs., Inc. v. Century Builders of Piedmont, Inc., 387 
S.C. 583, 588, 694 S.E.2d 15, 18 (2010).  
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Our supreme court previously addressed the validity of a similar territorial 
restriction in Somerset v. Reyner, 233 S.C. 324, 104 S.E.2d 344 (1958). In 
Somerset, a silversmith in the retail business of selling silver, china, crystal, and 
jewelry sold his shop located in the Five Points area of Columbia, South Carolina, 
to a local competitor.  233 S.C. at 327–28, 104 S.E.2d at 345–46.  As part of the 
sale, the seller covenanted not to engage in the business of selling silverware or 
jewelry in South Carolina for twenty years. Id. at 328, 104 S.E.2d at 346.  
Following the sale, the purchaser briefly employed the seller as manager of the 
shop but soon terminated his employment after about three months.  Id. at 329, 104 
S.E.2d at 346. The seller subsequently brought a declaratory judgment action, 
seeking a determination that, among other things, the geographic restriction was 
unreasonable and the covenant was void. Id. at 326, 104 S.E.2d at 345. The 
circuit court granted declaratory judgment, concluding the restriction was 
unreasonable and, thus, the covenant was void as against public policy.  Id.
On appeal, our supreme court affirmed, finding no rational basis for the extent of 
the statewide restriction.  Id. at 330, 104 S.E.2d at 347. The court noted the shop 
was a relatively small retail store, with its sales coming almost entirely from the 
greater Columbia area. Id. at 330, 104 S.E.2d at 346.  Indeed, Columbia sales 
accounted for 95% of its revenue prior to the sale.  Id. at 328, 104 S.E.2d at 345. 
Therefore, the court found that, to protect the purchaser's interest in the shop, it 
was not necessary to prohibit the seller from engaging in similar business in 
"Charleston, Spartanburg, Greenville[,] or numerous other cities in South 
Carolina." Id. at 330, 104 S.E.2d at 346. The court also rejected the purchaser's
argument that the seller was estopped from attacking the validity of the covenant 
because the seller, who indicated he had no intention of going back into the 
business, told the purchaser during negotiations that he could make the restriction 
for the entire state. Id. at 330–31, 104 S.E.2d at 347.  Likewise, the court declined 
to apply the "blue pencil" doctrine to redraw the scope of the restriction to make it 
reasonable because the covenant was "clearly indivisible" and "furnishe[d] no basis 
for dividing this territory." Id. at 332, 104 S.E.2d at 348. 
Turning to the instant case, the special referee found the 150-mile restriction was 
reasonable based upon two pieces of testimony.  First, the special referee noted 
Donald testified he wished to keep open the option of expanding Palmetto's
business throughout other counties in South Carolina.  The record, however, 
indicated Knight Systems—a small business located in Lexington County at the 
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time of the sale—only engaged in the mortuary transport business in Richland and 
Lexington counties prior to the sale to Palmetto.  In fact, at the time of Palmetto's
purchase, Knight Systems only had services contracts with Richland County, 
Lexington County, and the University of South Carolina in Columbia.  We do not 
believe Palmetto's tentative desire to expand its business throughout the state— 
without more evidence of definitive planning, acquisitions, or other overt acts— 
supports a finding that the restriction is reasonable. 
Second, the special referee relied upon Buddy's testimony that he did not intend to 
get back into the mortuary transport business after the sale to Palmetto.  As 
suggested in Somerset, we do not believe Appellants' intention of not returning to 
the mortuary transport business is a relevant factor for analyzing whether a 
territorial restriction is reasonable.  We also note Donald testified that Palmetto 
included the 150-mile restriction in the Covenant.  Although Knight Systems, with 
the assistance of counsel, agreed to the territorial restriction in the Covenant, we 
believe no rational basis exists for enforcing a territorial restriction covering the 
entire state and parts of neighboring states that prohibits Appellants from engaging 
in the mortuary transport business.  In our view, the 150-mile restriction was 
overly broad and did not protect the rights and interests of Palmetto in a reasonable 
manner. See Metts, 158 S.C. at 415, 155 S.E. at 735 (holding a territorial 
restriction must not be "more enlarged than essential for a reasonable protection of 
the rights of the purchasing party"). Accordingly, contrary to the special referee, 
we find the geographic restriction in the covenant is unreasonable and, therefore, is 
unenforceable. 
Further, although the Covenant's enforceability clause invites us to "blue pencil" 
the territorial restriction to one we find reasonable if the 150-mile restriction is 
deemed unenforceable, our longstanding precedent provides this court cannot 
modify the restriction.  See, e.g., Poynter Invs., 387 S.C. at 588, 694 S.E.2d at 18 
(holding that "restrictions in a non-compete clause cannot be rewritten by a court 
or limited by the parties' agreement, but must stand or fall on their own terms").   
In Team IA, Inc. v. Lucas, this court held that, while a nationwide territorial 
restriction in an employment non-compete agreement was overly broad and 
unreasonable, a smaller alternative restriction—or "step-down provision"—agreed 
to by the parties and contained in the contract could be valid and enforced by a 
court. 395 S.C. 237, 246, 717 S.E.2d 103, 107 (Ct. App. 2011).  In the instant 
case, however, the Covenant contains no step-down provision.  Thus, we find it 
would be impermissible for this court to redraw a smaller territorial restriction 
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because doing so would amount to rewriting the Covenant to add an arbitrary term 
upon which the parties did not negotiate or agree.  See Lowcountry Open Land Tr.
v. Charleston S. Univ., 376 S.C. 399, 410, 656 S.E.2d 775, 781 (Ct. App. 2008) 
("Courts only have the authority to specifically enforce contracts that the parties 
themselves have made; they do not have the authority to alter contracts or make 
new contracts for the parties."). 
II. Remaining Issues 
In light of our finding that the Covenant's territorial restriction is unreasonable and 
void, we decline to address the remaining issues on appeal.  See Futch v. 
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 
(1999) (ruling an appellate court need not address remaining issues when its 
resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we hold the Covenant's 150-mile territorial restriction is 
unreasonable and unenforceable. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
LOCKEMY and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Virginia L. Marshall and Todd W. Marshall, Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
Kenneth A. Dodds, M.D., Charleston Nephrology 
Associates, LLC, Georgia Roane, M.D., and 
Rheumatology Associates, P.A., Respondents. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2014-001833 
Appeal From Charleston County 
J.C. Nicholson, Jr., Circuit Court Judge 
Opinion No. 5403 

Heard February 11, 2016 – Filed May 4, 2016 

REVERSED AND REMANDED  

Blake A. Hewitt and John S. Nichols, both of Bluestein 
Nichols Thompson & Delgado, LLC, of Columbia; J. 
Edward Bell, III, of Bell Legal Group, of Georgetown; 
and C. Carter Elliott, Jr., of Elliott & Phelan, LLC, of
Georgetown, all for Appellants. 
James B. Hood, Robert H. Hood, H. Cooper Wilson, III, 
and Deborah H. Sheffield, all of Hood Law Firm, LLC, 
of Charleston; and Thomas R. Goldstein, of Belk Cobb 
Infinger & Goldstein, of Charleston, for Respondents 
Kenneth A. Dodds, M.D. and Charleston Nephrology 
Associates, LLC.  
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James E. Scott, IV, D. Jay Davis, Jr., Perry M. Buckner, 
IV, Stephen L. Brown, and Russell G. Hines, all of 
Young Clement Rivers, LLP, of Charleston, for 
Respondents Georgia Roane, M.D. and Rheumatology 
Associates, P.A. 
WILLIAMS, J.:  In this medical malpractice case, Virginia and Todd Marshall 
(the Marshalls) appeal the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Dr. Kenneth A. Dodds; Charleston Nephrology Associates, LLC; Dr. Georgia 
Roane; and Rheumatology Associates, P.A. (collectively "Respondents").  The 
Marshalls argue the court erred in holding the statute of repose for a medical 
malpractice action begins to run after a medical professional's first alleged 
misdiagnosis.  We reverse and remand. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In February 2010, Virginia was diagnosed with Waldenström's 
macroglobulinemia—or lymphoplasmacytic lymphoma—a rare form of blood 
cancer. Prior to this diagnosis, Virginia was treated by two physicians, Dr. Dodds 
and Dr. Roane, both of whom she alleges committed medical malpractice by 
failing to diagnose her cancer on multiple occasions.  
On September 15, 2004, Virginia visited Dr. Dodds, a nephrologist, after 
complaining of proteinuria, or increased protein levels in her urine.  This visit 
marked the first time Dr. Dodds had evaluated Virginia since 1999.  During this 
appointment, Dr. Dodds noted Virginia had a 24-hour urine test conducted on 
August 6, 2004, which revealed the protein levels in her urine were at 3.5 grams 
per day. At this point, Dr. Dodds did not order additional testing for Virginia's
proteinuria.  When Virginia visited Dr. Dodds again on November 14, 2004, she 
had no complaints and Dr. Dodds did not order additional testing for her 
proteinuria. 
At a February 7, 2005 appointment, Dr. Dodds ordered that Virginia again receive 
a 24-hour urine test. On February 9, 2005, the test indicated Virginia's protein 
levels were at approximately 3.1 grams per day.  Dr. Dodds did not order any 
further testing.  During her last visit on September 5, 2005, Virginia's 24-hour 
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urine test indicated the protein levels in her urine had increased to 4.2 grams per 
day. Dr. Dodds continued treatment for proteinuria, but he did not administer any 
additional testing. 
During the time she was seeing Dr. Dodds for her proteinuria, Virginia was also 
under the care of Dr. Roane, a rheumatologist.  In 2000, Dr. Roane diagnosed 
Virginia with mixed connective tissue disease (MCTD) and treated her for the 
suspected MCTD from 2000 to 2007. On April 29, 2005, while Dr. Roane was 
continuing treatment for MCTD, Virginia presented symptoms including elevated 
sedimentation rates, enlarged lymph nodes, proteinuria, fever, and chills.  At an 
appointment on September 29, 2005, a 24-hour urine test indicated Virginia's
protein levels increased from 3.5 to 4.2 grams per day from the previous year.  Dr. 
Roane, however, did not order further testing.
As a result of the alleged failures to diagnose Virginia's cancer during her 
treatments, the Marshalls pursued medical malpractice and loss of consortium
actions against Dr. Dodds, Dr. Roane, and their respective practices.  The 
Marshalls claimed Dr. Dodds was negligent in failing to recognize the signs and 
symptoms of elevated proteins in the urine and failing to order proper testing— 
including a urine protein electrophoresis test or a serum protein electrophoresis 
test—to determine if the type of protein in Virginia's urine was cancerous.  
Similarly, the Marshalls alleged Dr. Roane was negligent because she continued to 
misdiagnose Virginia's cancer as MCTD at the April 29, 2005 appointment.  The 
Marshalls also claimed Dr. Roane failed to order further testing for Virginia's
increased protein levels when she was no longer under the care of her nephrologist, 
Dr. Dodds, on and after the September 29, 2005 appointment. 
On February 7, 2011, the Marshalls contemporaneously filed a notice of intent to 
file suit (NOI), two expert witness affidavits, and a summons and complaint 
against Dr. Dodds and Charleston Nephrology Associates, LLC.  Subsequently, the 
Marshalls contemporaneously filed an NOI, an expert witness affidavit, and a 
summons and complaint against Dr. Roane and Rheumatology Associates, P.A. on 
April 8, 2011. The circuit court granted the Marshalls' motions to consolidate the 
two cases for purposes of discovery and trial.   
After the parties participated in discovery, Respondents filed separate motions for 
summary judgment.  Respondents argued the statute of repose for medical 
malpractice actions—section 15-3-545(A) of the South Carolina Code (2005)— 
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barred the Marshalls' claims because they brought their action more than six years 
after Dr. Dodds and Dr. Roane's first alleged negligent omissions in failing to 
diagnose her cancer. In their motion, Dr. Dodds and his practice asserted the 
alleged first misdiagnosis, on September 15, 2004, occurred more than six years 
prior to the commencement of the action against them.  Likewise, Dr. Roane and 
her practice contended the Marshalls' own expert opined Virginia's cancer would 
have been discoverable by Dr. Roane as early as February 2002—nine years before 
the commencement of the malpractice action.
On May 1, 2014, the circuit court granted Respondents' motions for summary 
judgment, holding the Marshalls' complaints were untimely because the statute of 
repose began to run after the first alleged misdiagnoses by Dr. Dodds and Dr. 
Roane. In reaching its conclusion, the court found Howell v. Zottoli, 691 S.E.2d 
564 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010), persuasive.  In Howell, the Georgia Court of Appeals 
concluded "a later negligent act cannot serve as the new starting point of the statute 
of repose where the negligent act is merely the repeated failure to diagnose and 
treat a continuing though worsening condition."  691 S.E.2d at 566. The circuit 
court found the Marshalls pled multiple failures by Dr. Dodds and Dr. Roane to 
diagnose Virginia's cancer that was likely present throughout the course of their 
treatment. Therefore, relying upon Howell, the court reasoned Dr. Dodds and Dr. 
Roane's subsequent misdiagnoses were merely a continuation of their first 
misdiagnoses, not distinct acts of negligence that could serve as new trigger points 
for the statute of repose. 
The Marshalls filed a motion to alter or amend judgment, and the circuit court 
denied their motion in a Form 4 order on August 7, 2014.  This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment under the same standard 
applied by the [circuit] court pursuant to Rule 56, SCRCP."  Lanham v. Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield of S.C., Inc., 349 S.C. 356, 361, 563 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2002). Rule 
56(c), SCRCP, provides that summary judgment shall be granted when "the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that . . . no genuine issue [exists] as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  
"Determining the proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and th[e 
appellate c]ourt reviews questions of law de novo."  Lambries v. Saluda Cty. 
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 Council, 409 S.C. 1, 7, 760 S.E.2d 785, 788 (2014) (quoting Town of Summerville 
v. City of N. Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 110, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008)).   
 
LAW/ANALYSIS  
 
The Marshalls argue the circuit court erred in holding the statute of repose for their 
medical malpractice claims began to run after Dr. Dodds and Dr. Roane's first 
alleged misdiagnoses.  We agree. 
 
"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent 
of the [General Assembly]."  Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 
581 (2000). "The [General Assembly]'s intent should be ascertained primarily 
from the plain language of the statute."  Ex parte Cannon, 385 S.C. 643, 655, 685 
S.E.2d 814, 821 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Georgia-Carolina Bail Bonds, Inc. v. 
Cty. of Aiken, 354 S.C. 18, 23, 579 S.E.2d 334, 336 (Ct. App. 2003)).  "Words 
must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced 
construction to limit or expand the statute's operation."  Sloan v. Hardee, 371 S.C. 
495, 499, 640 S.E.2d 457, 459 (2007).  "If, however, the language of the statute 
gives rise to doubt or uncertainty as to legislative intent, the construing court looks 
to the statute's language as a whole in light of its manifest purpose."  Ex parte 
Cannon, 385 S.C. at 655, 685 S.E.2d at 821.  "The construing court may 
additionally look to the legislative history when determining the legislative intent."  
Id.   
 
"A statute of repose creates a substantive right in those protected to be free from 
liability after a legislatively-determined period of time."  Langley v. Pierce, 313 
S.C. 401, 404, 438 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1993) (quoting First United Methodist Church 
v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 866 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 
(1990)). "[A] statute of repose is typically an absolute time limit beyond which 
liability no longer exists and is not tolled for any reason because to do so would 
upset the economic balance struck by the legislative body."  Id. (quoting First 
United Methodist Church, 882 F.2d at 866). 
 
In South Carolina, medical malpractice actions are governed by a six-year statute 
of repose. Subsection 15-3-545(A) provides the following: 
 
[A]ny action, other than actions controlled by subsection 
(B), to recover damages for injury to the person arising 
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out of any medical, surgical, or dental treatment, 
omission, or operation by any licensed health care 
provider . . . must be commenced within three years from
the date of the treatment, omission, or operation giving 
rise to the cause of action or three years from the date of 
discovery or when it reasonably ought to have been 
discovered, not to exceed six years from date of 
occurrence, or as tolled by this section. 
(emphasis added).  The statute's six-year period "constitutes an outer limit beyond 
which a medical malpractice claim is barred, regardless of whether it has or should 
have been discovered." Hoffman v. Powell, 298 S.C. 338, 339–40, 380 S.E.2d 821, 
821 (1989). 
Because the statute of repose does not explicitly define "occurrence," we believe a 
review of the legislative history is instructive.  Prior to the enactment of section 15­
3-545(A), all personal injury actions were subject to a six-year statute of 
limitations, requiring such suits be brought within six years "after the cause of 
action shall have accrued." Code of Laws of S.C. § 10-102, -143(5) (1962) 
(emphasis added).  Nevertheless, a jurisdictional split began to emerge concerning 
the definition of "accrued" in various state statutes of limitations in the context of 
medical malpractice. See, e.g., Gattis v. Chavez, 413 F. Supp. 33, 38 (D.S.C. 
1976) (providing a discussion on the jurisdictional split).  Some courts retained the 
traditional view that "accrued" meant the time of the medical professional's alleged 
negligent act or omission, while others steadily began to hold that, pursuant to the 
"discovery rule," it meant when the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered 
the injury that arose from such negligence.  See id.
In Gattis, the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina held that, if 
faced with the question, our supreme court would judicially adopt the discovery 
rule. 413 F. Supp. at 39. The following year, the General Assembly adopted the 
discovery rule with a newly created statute of limitations for medical malpractice 
actions. See Act No. 182, 1977 S.C. Acts 453 (stating the action must be 
commenced "within three years from the date of the treatment, omission[,] or 
operation giving rise to the cause of action or three years from the date of 
discovery or when it reasonably ought to have been discovered"). However, 
because the discovery rule arguably would produce great uncertainty—allowing 
plaintiffs to bring actions against medical professionals at any time in the future— 
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the General Assembly also created a statute of repose, barring all causes of action 
brought more than six years following an "occurrence."  See id.; see also Hoffman, 
298 S.C. at 341–42, 380 S.E.2d at 822–23 (noting other states enacted statutes of 
repose to curtail the "long tail" exposure to malpractice claims brought about by 
the discovery rule). 
Based upon the legislative history of the statute of repose and our precedents, we 
find that "occurrence"—for purposes of the statute—means the time of an alleged 
negligent treatment, omission, or operation by a medical professional.  See, e.g., 
O'Tuel v. Villani, 318 S.C. 24, 27, 455 S.E.2d 698, 700 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding 
the occurrence that triggered the statute of repose was on the date of the child's
birth, when a physician failed to perform a caesarean delivery, not seven years later 
when the parents discovered the child had learning disabilities), overruled on other 
grounds by I'On, LLC v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 423 & n.12, 526 
S.E.2d 716, 725 & n.12 (2000); Johnson v. Phifer, 309 S.C. 505, 507, 424 S.E.2d 
532, 534 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding the statute of repose barred a patient's claim 
against a dentist filed in 1990 when the alleged negligent treatment occurred from
1974 to 1977).   
Consequently, the statute of repose begins to run at the time of an alleged negligent 
act or omission by a medical professional upon which a plaintiff seeks to impose 
liability in a cause of action for malpractice.  See Grier v. AMISUB of S.C., Inc., 
397 S.C. 532, 537, 725 S.E.2d 693, 696 (2012) ("A plaintiff, to establish a cause of 
action for negligence, must prove the following four elements: (1) a duty of care 
owed by defendant to [the] plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty by a negligent act or 
omission; (3) resulting in damages to the plaintiff; and (4) damages proximately 
resulted from the breach of duty." (emphasis omitted) (quoting Thomasko v. Poole, 
349 S.C. 7, 11, 561 S.E.2d 597, 599 (2002))). Therefore, we hold that when a 
plaintiff alleges a misdiagnosis or failure to diagnose a condition within the six-
year period—which an expert witness opines to be a breach of the physician's duty 
of care1—the statute of repose does not bar the cause of action merely because the 
physician previously misdiagnosed the condition outside the repose period.    
1 See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-36-100(B) (Supp. 2015) (providing that a plaintiff in a 
professional negligence action "must file[,] as a part of the complaint[,] an affidavit 
of an expert witness which must specify at least one negligent act or omission 
claimed to exist and the factual basis for each claim based on the available 
evidence at the time of the filing of the affidavit").  
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Turning to the facts of the instant case, the Marshalls concede they may not seek to 
impose liability on Dr. Dodds and Dr. Roane for negligent acts or omissions made 
outside the repose period.  The Marshalls, however, alleged specific dates and 
appointments within the six-year repose period when Dr. Dodds and Dr. Roane 
failed to diagnose Virginia's cancer.  The Marshalls' expert witnesses—Dr. Barry 
Singer and Dr. Robert Luke—opined that Dr. Dodds breached his duty of care at 
the February and September 2005 appointments, noting the protein levels in 
Virginia's urine were elevated from previous tests and, thus, should have signaled 
to Dr. Dodds that cancerous protein was present and further testing was required.  
Likewise, the Marshalls' other expert, Dr. Thomas Zizic, opined that Dr. Roane 
breached her duty of care at the April 29, 2005 appointment by prescribing potent 
immunosuppressants when Virginia did not have MCTD.  Dr. Zizic also opined 
that Dr. Roane was negligent during and after the September 29, 2005 
appointment—when Virginia was no longer under the care of Dr. Dodds—because 
she continued to misdiagnose Virginia's cancer as MCTD and was under a duty to 
perform further testing after learning Virginia's urine protein levels were elevated. 
Additionally, the Marshalls properly alleged each element of their causes of action 
for medical malpractice: (1) Dr. Dodds and Dr. Roane owed a duty of care to 
Virginia; (2) they breached that duty in failing to diagnose her cancer; (3) Virginia 
suffered damages, including pain and suffering, lost wages, and medical expenses; 
and (4) Dr. Dodds and Dr. Roane's negligence proximately caused Virginia's
damages.  Therefore, we find the Marshalls' medical malpractice claims for alleged 
negligent acts occurring within six years of commencing the instant actions against 
Respondents are not barred by the statute of repose. 
Nevertheless, Respondents contend Dr. Dodds and Dr. Roane's alleged subsequent 
misdiagnoses were merely a continuation of their first misdiagnoses, not new and 
independent negligent acts or omissions that "retrigger" the statute of repose.  
According to Respondents, South Carolina's statute of repose begins to run after a 
medical professional's first misdiagnosis.  In making this argument, Respondents— 
like the circuit court—rely upon the Georgia Court of Appeals' decision in Howell. 
In Howell, a patient was treated by a doctor in October 1996 after complaining of 
blood in his urine.  691 S.E.2d at 565. Although the patient never returned for in-
office appointments, the doctor continued to provide him with several referrals and 
weight-loss prescriptions.  Id. In 2001, the patient died of coronary heart disease, 
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and his wife subsequently sued the doctor in 2003 for medical malpractice.  Id. 
The decedent's wife alleged the doctor failed to properly diagnose and treat her 
husband's multiple cardiovascular risk factors present during the course of his care, 
including "morbid obesity, smoking, high cholesterol, diabetes, high blood 
pressure, and a family history of coronary heart disease."  Id. The trial court, 
however, granted summary judgment in favor of the doctor, holding Georgia's five-
year medical malpractice statute of repose barred her suit.  Id. 
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed, finding Georgia's statute of 
repose—which is based upon when the negligent act causing the patient's injury 
occurred—began to run on the date of the doctor's first misdiagnosis of the 
decedent's condition.  Id. at 566–67. In reaching its decision, the court relied upon 
the Supreme Court of Georgia's directive that, in cases of a misdiagnosis or failure 
to diagnose a continuing condition, "[t]he misdiagnosis itself is the injury and not 
the subsequent discovery of the proper diagnosis."  Kaminer v. Canas, 653 S.E.2d 
691, 694 (Ga. 2007) (quoting Frankel v. Clark, 444 S.E.2d 147, 149 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1994)).2 
We find Respondents' interpretation of subsection 15-3-545(A) is unduly 
expansive and their reliance upon Howell is misplaced. See Sloan, 371 S.C. at 499, 
640 S.E.2d at 459 (stating courts must not resort to subtle or forced construction to 
expand a statute's operation).  Our statute of repose differs from Georgia's because 
it solely focuses on the time of the medical professional's negligent act or 
omission, not the patient's injury.  A patient's damages in the case of a prior 
misdiagnosis discovered later with a proper diagnosis often include death, pain and 
suffering, lost wages, and medical expenses.  Unlike the Supreme Court of 
Georgia, we find a patient's injury and ensuing damages in these situations are not 
the misdiagnosis itself, but rather are a result of the misdiagnosis.  A misdiagnosis
is simply the negligent act or omission that gives rise to the cause of action for 
malpractice.  Therefore, we find Howell unpersuasive. Accordingly, we reject 
Respondents' argument and hold the circuit court erred in relying upon Georgia 
2 In Kaminer, the court held Georgia's statutes of limitations and repose in most 
misdiagnosis cases "begin to run simultaneously on the date that the doctor 
negligently failed to diagnose the condition and, thereby, injured the patient."  653 
S.E.2d at 694. 
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law to determine South Carolina's statute of repose begins to run after a medical 
professional's first misdiagnosis. 
Respondents also argue our interpretation of South Carolina's statute of repose for 
medical malpractice actions would effectively be an adoption of the continuous 
treatment rule that was rejected by our supreme court in Harrison v. Bevilacqua, 
354 S.C. 129, 580 S.E.2d 109 (2003).  Under the continuous treatment rule, when a 
patient's illness or injury imposes upon his doctor a duty to continue treatment, the 
statutes of limitation and repose do not begin to run until the termination of the 
doctor's treatment.  Id. at 135, 580 S.E.2d at 112. The continuous treatment rule is 
a tolling mechanism that our supreme court found would run afoul of the General 
Assembly's objective to limit liability with the medical malpractice statutes of 
limitations and repose.  Id. at 138, 580 S.E.2d at 114.  Our interpretation, however, 
is entirely consistent with Harrison because we are not suggesting the statute of 
repose is tolled until the termination of a physician's course of treatment.  To the 
contrary, we hold the statute begins to run at the time of a medical professional's 
alleged negligent act or omission for which the plaintiff seeks to impose liability 
without regard to when the course of treatment ended. 
In our view, the first misdiagnosis rule advocated by Respondents would allow 
medical professionals to escape liability for subsequent acts of negligence—even 
when they clearly constitute a breach of the standard of care—only because they 
failed to properly diagnose the patient's condition in the past.  It is possible for a 
patient to continually present symptoms, or even new or worsening symptoms, that 
should alert the physician to perform additional testing or reevaluate a prior 
diagnosis.  See Kaminer, 653 S.E.2d at 698 (Hunstein, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is 
possible for a doctor to misdiagnose a patient more than once in the course of 
treatment, where new or more severe symptoms would, under the relevant standard 
of care, require a reassessment of the initial diagnosis.").  Under the rule advocated 
by Respondents, however, physicians—to be immune from suit—could simply 
point to a time outside the limitations period when they examined the patient and 
should have diagnosed the condition. We do not believe the General Assembly 
intended such a result when it enacted the statute of repose for medical malpractice 
actions. See Hodges, 341 S.C. at 85, 533 S.E.2d at 581 (holding "[t]he cardinal 
rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the 
[General Assembly]").  
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we hold the circuit court erred in finding the 
statute of repose for medical malpractice actions begins to run after a medical 
professional's first alleged misdiagnosis.  Therefore, we reverse the circuit court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondents and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
LOCKEMY and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 
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